PLA Chinese Soldier Assessment
by the PLA 27th Army

27th Army CCF Assessment

"Our tactics were mechanical. We underestimated the enemy so we distributed the strength, and consequently the higher echelons were over dispersed while the lower echelon units were over concentrated. During one movement, the distance between the three leading divisions was very long, while the formations of the battalions, companies, and units of lower levels were too close, and the troops were unable to deploy. Furthermore, reconnaissance was not conducted strictly; we walked into the enemy fire and suffered heavy casualties."

"The Marines were not exterminated promptly because our troops encountered unfavorable conditions during the missions and the troops suffered too many casualties." (This would be another way of saying that the Chinese failed to destroy the 1st Marine Division because they themselves were nearly destroyed in the attempt.)

"The troops did not have enough food, they did not have enough houses to live in, they could not stand the bitter cold, which was the reason for excessive non-combat reduction in personnel (more than 10,000 persons), the weapons were not used effectively. When the fighters bivouacked in snow covered ground during combat, their feet, socks, and hands were frozen together in one ice ball; they could not unscrew the caps on the hand grenades; the fuses would not ignite; the hands were not supple; the mortar tubes shrank on account of the cold; 70 per cent of the shells failed to detonate; skin from the hands was stuck on the shells and the mortar tubes."