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Chinese Forces Logistical Problem in Korea - Page 2 Changes MadeTo address the urgent shortfalls, the Central Military Commission directed the Northeast Military Command to hold a special logistics meeting in early 1951. This convened on January 22-30 in Shenyang, and resulted in several improvements in ground and rail transportation support to the war. Problems Continue But problems continued. In May 1951, Peng sent Deputy Commander Hong Xuezhi to Beijing to urge that an operational unified logistics command be set up to direct all support, including protection of supply lines. The military leadership agreed, but to his dismay, Hong was selected the CPV logistics commander. He, like many revolutionary veterans at the time, disdained logistics. He accepted command only with the promise that he would not have any logistics responsibilities after the war. From 1950 to 1954, Hong Xuezhi concurrently served as the Deputy Commander and Commander of Logistics of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV). Under his leadership, the basis for a modernized operational logistics system was established. |
| General Hong Xuezhi | |
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During the war, China's power projection and support capabilities
sufficiently developed to support one million soldiers and underwrite an
operational stalemate against a modern, advanced opponent outside China's
territory.
Huang Gezheng, a protégé of Peng Dehuai, served as the Director of
the General Rear Services Department (GRSD) from 1954 to 1956. After the war,
Hong Xuezhi, also closely associated with Peng, became the GRSD director in
1956, while Huang was promoted to Chief of the General Staff.
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